Jayadeva Ranade
The last round of talks (January 27-31) between Beijing and the Dalai Lama’s envoys was held after a 15-month hiatus. This was just weeks before the Tibetans were getting ready to celebrate ‘Losar’ and the Chinese to usher in the ‘Year of the Tiger’ — both on February 14. This round, the ninth after such contacts commenced in 2002, was the prelude to both sides raising the stakes, especially in the weeks following the contact.
Beijing initiated this contact at a time when it perceived its international stature as considerably enhanced. The way successive western governments capitulated to Beijing’s demand that they avoid meeting the Dalai Lama buoyed its self-confidence. The decision of US President Barack Obama to break with a 19-year tradition and not meet the Dalai Lama particularly heartened Beijing. The backdrop for the negotiations, carefully arranged in the months preceding the talks, reflected that Beijing would adopt an unyielding posture towards the Dalai Lama and the Tibet problem. Controls inside Tibet and Tibetan areas were enhanced in the months before negotiations. The drive to register the qualifications of religious personages was intensified.
Days before the arrival of the Dalai Lama’s envoys, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership convened two high level conferences in Beijing and the Tibet Party Congress met in Lhasa. These approved the Chinese leadership’s future policy towards Tibet and the Tibetan issue. The entire Politburo Standing Committee attended the meetings in Beijing, where Tibet was discussed for the first time after the March 2008 Tibet riots. The mood of the Chinese leadership was evident at the first Politburo meeting when Hu Jintao, who combines the posts of China’s President, party general secretary and chairman of the Military Commission, launched a rare personal attack on the 74-year-old Dalai Lama. He accused him of engaging in ‘Tibetan independence’ activities and ‘sabotaging’ social stability. A massive development package for TAR and, for the very first time, for all Tibetan areas in the adjacent provinces, was approved and the target for Tibet’s growth was fixed at 12 per cent. The Dalai Lama’s establishment at Dharamsala interprets this as tacit acceptance of their plea for a ‘greater Tibet’! Interestingly, PLA personnel were earlier promised an incentive of approximately US$ 24,000 for serving in Tibet, which could be preparatory to creating an organisation to settle them in Tibet.
The TAR Congress, held in Lhasa, heralded more stringent policies. Padma Choling, 58, who has an Army background and access to Hu, was appointed TAR governor. His appointment reinforces the policies pursued by Zhang Qingli, the TAR party secretary. Zhang is best known for his severe description, after the March 2008 riots in Tibet, of the Dalai Lama as ‘a wolf in monk’s clothes’ and ‘a devil with a human face, but the heart of a beast’.
Beijing’s agenda for the talks was telegraphed in advance by China’s official media. The Dalai Lama was criticised for describing himself as a ‘son of India’ and ignoring the interests of Tibetans and China, his motherland. He was chided for forgetting that ‘Chinese Buddhism (had) played a very important role in the formation and development of Tibetan Buddhism…’ The issue of Arunachal Pradesh was raised and the Dalai Lama’s loyalty to Tibetans questioned. It asked ‘will a guy who betrayed southern Tibet to India really care about the well-being of the Tibet people?’ The Dalai Lama was also bluntly informed that ‘at the age of 75, time is not on (his) side’ and he for ‘his own sake he needs to make the most of the opportunity provided by the current round of talks with the central government.’
The Tibetan visitors were first taken to Changsha in Hunan, closely associated with Mao Zedong, implicitly conveying that communist China is not going to change its system of government. The Dalai Lama’s proposals would, therefore, need to adhere to the existing Chinese constitution. During talks later in Beijing, the Chinese again referred to ‘southern Tibet’. They reminded the Tibetan envoys that Beijing had accorded recognition to Dalai Lamas since the Qing dynasty and the Dalai Lama remained subject to Chinese law. By the time the actual talks began, however, the international climate was changing. The US and the rest of the West were beginning to apply pressure on China on a variety of issues, including human rights and Tibet. President Obama also announced his decision to receive the Dalai Lama at the White House. But China’s response was unyielding.
The five-member delegation led by the Dalai Lama’s special envoy, Lodi Gyari, left New Delhi for China on January 26, 2010. Prior to its departure the delegation was briefed by Samdong Rimpoche and the Dalai Lama. Notably, despite persistent Chinese requests to replace some members, the composition of the delegation remained unchanged.
The latest round of talks made it clear that there would be no change in China’s position and that Beijing was waiting for the Dalai Lama’s departure from the scene. Tibetan demands, including ‘greater autonomy’ and preservation of Tibetan culture and religion in the ‘Cholka Sum’ (Greater Tibet), were rejected. Chinese officials raised the ante at a press conference later in Beijing, when they stressed that the envoys were participating in a private capacity and only matters relating personally to the Dalai Lama, or his close associates, could be raised. The Dalai Lama was urged to sort out the issues in his lifetime and Tibetans were advised to ponder over their future after the Dalai Lama’s departure. But the Dalai Lama also raised the stakes and ensured that the door would be kept open for further negotiations. The statement traditionally issued by this Dalai Lama each March 10 unexpectedly raised the spectre of China’s two largest minorities residing in two of its biggest, sensitive border provinces making common cause.
In his statement, the Dalai Lama expressed ‘solidarity’ with the people of ‘East Turkestan’ and said he ‘stands firmly with them’. This is the first ever reference in his March 10 statements to ‘East Turkestan’ and follows his meetings with Uyghur leader Rebiya Kadeer. The prospect of the Dalai Lama’s well-oiled lobbying and fund-raising organisation assisting the networks of action-oriented Uyghur ‘separatists’ inside China, will cause considerable discomfort to the Chinese leadership. It will make implementation of policies, being framed by China’s leadership for tackling restiveness in the Tibet and Xinjiang-Uyghur Autonomous Regions, much more difficult. The Chinese will need to defuse this potentially troublesome situation.
The author is a former Additional Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India
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[OPINION-DISCLAIMER]
