By Renato Palmi
South Africa: Last week South Africa decided to use its first vote in the United Nation’s Security Council to side with Russia and China in blocking a resolution on Burma. Renato Palmi from the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa looks at the parallels between Tibet and Burma
Introduction
The period post-World War II saw nearly 600 million people being liberated from colonial rule in Asia. This liberation inspired immense nationalist aspirations throughout Asia including China, which was undergoing a civil war between its Nationalist and Communist movements. The initial de-colonisation of Asia had its foundation at the start of the First World War. Prior to this, colonial power was at its height but the war brought to the end this period of “New Imperialism” (Mydal, 1968: 138). The Second World War was the final catalyst for Asian de-colonisation and the introduction of developmental programs for the newly founded independent countries in Asia.
This essay will look at Burma* and Tibet**, their links with Britain as a colonial power and the role that China has and continues to play in these two countries. The essay will also show that development in Burma and Tibet has been and still is an unusual and difficult process, as the standard developmental theories, whether those of Keynesians or Neo-Classical thinkers, which hold that the economy works on its own, have not and cannot work in the contemporary climate of these two countries.
The natural process for developing countries as indicated by Rostow’s “Stages of Growth” or even Lewis’s proposal of using labour to boost development, has not worked. Analysis of the application of contemporary theoretical models for developing countries clarifies that none have really worked in these two countries for various reasons.
The History of Burma and Tibet
In their recent history, both countries have come under the influence of Britain. In 1904, Britain invaded Tibet to counter Russian presence in the area. Britain annexed Burma first in 1852, when they took over Lower Burma for economic gain and Upper Burma in 1886 in response to French infiltration into the area. Major political changes, affecting both countries, occurred after 1945. When Burma achieved independence in 1948, Tibet was on the point of been invaded by the newly formed People’s Republic of China.
It is fair to say that Tibet was economically and developmentally a backward country prior to the Chinese invasion, but the Tibetan people were content with their way of life, and their temporal and spiritual leader, the 14th Dalai Lama, was initiating developmental changes in Tibet. When Burma gained its independence, it had a fairly strong economy, being one of the leading global exporters of rice. Like Tibet, Burma also has a large amount of natural resources, which if used in the correct manner would, assist in its modernisation and economic growth.
During the years post-1945, Burma’s potential for development was adversely affected due to the inefficiency of the ruling military junta that overthrew the fledgling Burmese democracy, resulting in Burma becoming an international pariah. As in Tibet, there is no fair distribution of wealth and only a small percentage of the population gain from any trade and development activities. China, through “bully-boy” tactics in tandem with its recent vigorous economic expansion worldwide, has managed to ensure that Tibet is now seen by all in the international community as an integral part of China.
However, this essay will demonstrate that most of the developmental progress taking place in Tibet does not bring benefits to the ethnic Tibetans, but rather to the growing population of Han Chinese in Tibet. The PRC government is using all of Tibet’s resources, whether natural or human, to meet its growing demands for raw material and energy.
Because of the wealth disparities, the rise in ethnic nationalism and the unevenness of developmental projects so evident in the Burmese and Tibetan socio-economic profiles, both Burma and Tibet are potential hot-spots of unrest. The international community and economic institutions such as the World Bank and World Trade Organisation, are adding fuel to this rising fire of social frustration. These respective national experiences clearly demonstrate the unethical and contradictory manner in which these global institutions and their own governments operate. For example, these institutions call for trade sanctions and political boycotts of the ruling military junta in Burma because of its human rights violations, but these very same institutions and governments encourage the PRC’s projects inside Tibet without any consideration of the impact such projects will have for indigenous Tibetans and their natural environment. Furthermore, they will not and do not call for economic sanctions against China.
In recent years the ruling elite of these two countries have adopted a heavily state-controlled “open market” approach that is Keynesian in character. The military junta in Burma, as does the PRC inside Tibet, controls every facet of the economy, ensuring that the proceeds benefit them and their economic partners, namely, the Chinese.
China’s Influence in Asia
The Asian countries may have gained independence from Western colonial influence, but this independence is seriously threatened by the growing dominance of China. According to K.M. Panikkar, “China may not have been the new economic giant it is today if it had not been for the First World War …” (Panikkar, 1953: 227). He states that the war prevented the European powers from dividing up China between them.
The formidable growth of China’s economy in recent years has allowed it to play a more important role in Asia, and to strengthen its aim of gaining political, military and economic supremacy in the region. With Burma becoming more dependent on China for development projects, China sees an opportunity to boost her presence and influence in South Asia, as has already been the case for the PRC forces in Tibet. Both Burma and Tibet share borders with China. China is constructing railway links between Burma and Tibet, which will greatly facilitate the movement of trade, and of troops and military hardware between the two countries.
The state of Burma and Tibet today
While the rest of Asia may be developing and its populations benefiting from open market policies and globalisation, the indigenous people of Burma and Tibet are becoming poorer, losing not only their national identities and unique cultures, but also their chances of progressing economically. Today, both these countries have a government in-exile, and democratically elected leaders who have been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Burma’s democratically chosen leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, is under permanent house-arrest in Burma, while the Dalai Lama has lived in exile in northern India since 1959. Both exiled governments continue to plead for political freedom for their people, and for developmental projects that would be both sustainable and beneficial to the entire populace. Ironically enough, in the case of Burma, the international community has seen fit to call for economic sanctions against the ruling Burmese autocracy, yet with regard to Tibet, where the PRC is illegally occupying a sovereign state, the world is silent in the face of China’s economic might, leaving her free to pursue her imperialistic objectives for the control of the whole of Asia.
Burma
It was the nation’s fervent uprising against foreign rule that led to Britain’s swift withdrawal from Burma, which led to the latter’s declaration of independence on 4 January 1948. The first free elections took place in 1947, and the popular General Bogyoke Aung San (father of Aung San Suu Kyi, current leader of the opposition party, the National League for Democracy) was elected to lead, but was assassinated by members of the socialist movement. Despite objections from the hill-tribes and other ethnic minorities seeking autonomy from the greater Burmese community, the “… new state which came into being as a parliamentary democracy survived as a respective government until the army coup of 1962.” (Burma Campaign UK, 2002).
For the next few decades, Burma’s leadership became very inward-turning, while the military junta took firm control of the country. General Bogyoke Aung San’s successor, Ne Win, allowed Burma to drift into socialism, which caused an economic crisis. He formed the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) and adopted a programme known as “The Burmese Way to Socialism” (Burma Campaign UK, 2002), which amongst other things, rejected foreign investment. As the rest of Asia began to develop, Burma became increasingly impoverished.
In 1988, another military leader, General Than Shwe, took power after a coup d’etat, and a new government was formed by the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). They promised free elections and economic changes in reaction to the previous junta’s policy of nationalising many companies (under the plan of “The Burmese Way to Socialism”, which had resulted in job losses for thousands, and a concomitant rise in poverty, mainly amongst the Burmese minority groups). In this period of change, the National League for Democracy (NLD), as the opposition party, was consolidated under the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi. To counter this groundswell from the opposition, the SLROC diverged from socialist to capitalist policies, but this response was in vain.
In 1990, the ruling party succumbed to international pressure and allowed free elections, which were won by Aung San Suu Kyi’s party. The SLROC immediately imprisoned her and banned the NLD. Realising that Burma was on the verge of bankruptcy, and with the pressure of international economic sanctions, the ruling SLROC junta dissolved itself in 1997, firing a number of corrupt officials and renaming itself “The State Peace and Development Council” (SPDC).
The SLROC / SPDC spearheaded the “Burmese way to capitalism”, promoting an open market philosophy which has led to the SPDC gaining more power, with greater wealth for its leaders and with Chinese immigrants being granted full citizenship. The latter has afforded China a perfect economic foothold in Burma at the expense of its indigenous people and ethnic minorities, (not to speak of the principles of freedom and democracy) and she has become one of the main foreign investors in Burma.
Chua (2003: 24) describes the Chinese influence in Burma thus:
Since Burma’s shift to a market-oriented, open-door economy, both Rangoon, the modern capital, and Mandalay, the ancient City of Gems and the royal seat of the last two Burmese kings, have been taken over by ethnic Chinese. The Sino-Burmese minorities have been transformed almost overnight into a garishly prosperous business community … Only a tiny, dying handful of Burman-owned establishments … are left, dwarfed by the Chinese-built and Chinese-owned high-rise buildings around them.
Even though the SPDC began to open up Burma’s economic doors in the late 1990s, according to the United Nations Human Development Index (Booth, 2003) Burma’s GDP per capita and other development indicators were lower than India and China in 1999 (UNDP 2001, 142-3). “Income per person had fallen from $670 a year in 1960 to $200 in 1989” (Booth, 2003). She also refers to data published in the SOAS Bulletin of Burma Research that there has not been much structural change in Burma’s development since 1938, with agricultural output today being the same as it was then. Distribution of wealth has not been even-handed and particular sectors remain disadvantaged. A rise in military expenditure as led to a decrease in budget allocations to health care. The United Nations Human Development Index ranked Burma 118 in 2001; this approaches the lowest of the “medium development group”, (UNDP 2001, 143).
Even the International Monetary Fund has stated that poverty reduction in Burma was poor compared to most other East Asian economies (International Monetary Fund 1999: 30). Despite favourable laws and numerous opportunities for foreign investment, there have been remarkable losses in this sector, from US$ 2.8 billion in 1996/97 to US$58 million in 1999/2000 (Booth, 2003). Why is an open economic policy not resulting in demonstrable growth in Burma? Leifer (1998) argues that the reason is regionalism. Burma recently became a member of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the aim of the association being to coalesce for the control of development activities in order to benefit the ruling governments. On his view, the ASEAN way of doing business is not conducive to the ideologies of Western development:
The ASEAN way of conflict management and security is unrestricted, informal and based on consensus. At the same time it is an inward-looking, almost cynical way of ensuring the survival of the grouping’s ruling elites by emphasising non-interference and economic growth. The ASEAN principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of another state have been described as unexceptional norms (Leifer, 1996 cited in McGrew and Brook, 1998).
Burma’s SPDC has a stake in many development programmes, which allows the ruling junta to dictate the location and strategies for roll-out of such programmes. The profits gained are not redistributed across the populace, but are siphoned off into the coffers of the elite.
Other countries and individual corporations are more than willing to take advantage of Burma’s cheap labour and incentives for investment by trading with Burma, and one of these countries is South Africa. According to the South African Department of Foreign Affairs (2003), South Africa imports footwear, headgear, vegetable products and machinery from Burma and these imports grew by 117.2% between 2002 and 2003.
Burma now faces a dilemma in terms of economic growth and development. It is apparent that the prevailing regime’s open-door economic policy and structures supporting so-called development are not underpinned with the intention of improving the living standards of the Burmese people. The European Union has noted that only two to four per cent of Burma’s national income is spent on health care programmes, while nearly half is spent on the ruling junta’s army (Burma Campaign UK, 2004). Clearly, dramatic corrective action will be required in due course. Pro-democracy activists maintain that the only alternative is for Burma to have a political change, which is unlikely. Many human rights organisations say that international sanctions will bring about changes in Burma. To do this effectively, there global co-operation would be essential.
Currently there is no law prohibiting countries or corporations from investing in Burma. The lack of support for economic sanctions by many Asian countries and the ruling junta’s membership of ASEAN prevent any substantial sanctions that could compel the SPDC to pursue economic and political change. If global sanctions were to be effected, these could result in further hardship for the vast majority of Burmese people, and could lead to the SPDC forging even closer ties with China.
Cook and Minogue (1993) state that there are two alternatives for the current Burmese government, which they claim is “hostage to political reform”. One alternative is for Burma to replace its current open economic programmes with more socialist policies reminiscent of those practised prior to 1988. The other alternative is described thus:
A state-led process of gradual economic and political change … Such changes may provide a stable platform from which to launch liberalising economic reforms and might well produce a renewal of the aid and investment resources, from both bilateral and multilateral agencies, needed to underpin effective reforms (Cook et al, 1993: 1151 – 1160).
In concluding this section on Burma, suffice to say that development has been greatly affected by the inability of the ruling party to formulate a climate conducive to economic growth. In 1987, the government “… made an application to have Burma reclassified as a ‘least developed economy’, which signalled to the outside world just how far behind the Asian ‘tigers’ Burma had fallen” (Booth, 2003). Gradual economic reform was evident after independence, but this was curtailed by the 1962 coup.
The subsequent policy of the “Burmese Way to Socialism”, led to Burma’s decline in development and brought about an economic crisis that was only alleviated in the late 1990s (to a certain extent) by its new policy of market liberalisation. Most blame Burma’s military juntas for her lack of development since 1962. However, can be counter-argued by the examples elsewhere in Asia of “military-led governments, displaying scant regard for democratic niceties, have achieved rapid rates of economic growth and structural transformation” (Booth, 2003).
The SPDC claims that there have been certain developmental changes, but do not acknowledge the imbalances of such growth. They are proud to cite their expansive road and railway network as one example, but as Amy Chua explains, such development has been at a high cost: “Chinese companies are developing the railway line … with the help of chain gangs from Burma’s prisons …” (Chua, 2003: 24 – 25). Local Burmese businesses have not been supported by any proceeds from such expansions. In its pursuit of wealth, the ruling junta has little respect for the environmental consequences for the local habitat of mining for gems and of clear-cutting valuable rainforests.
Anne Booth (2003) refers to reports from the Burma Campaign UK that “Commercial over-fishing has stolen the traditional livelihood of thousands of fishing families …”, and that all developmental programmes proceed “… without public input, reliable economic data or official accountability.” She writes that inflation is depriving the majority of Burmese of even the small purchasing power they had, and lowering their living standards every year.
Developmentally, Burma is stagnating. She has the potential to develop fast using Rostow’s “theory of stages” (cited in Booth, 2003), which explained the “significance of overall economic indicators, but also recognised the relevance of political, institutional and social frameworks”. Whether political and economic reforms could be brought about peacefully or violently would depend upon the agenda and power-base of the ruling elite and the active will of the Burmese populace to restore democracy.
Tibet
While many colonised Asian countries gained independence after World War II, Tibet was invaded in 1950 by the army of the newly formed People’s Republic of China. Contrary to prevailing Chinese propaganda, Tibet was a sovereign nation (Tibetan Parliamentary and Policy Research Centre, 1998: 5). After the Dalai Lama’s flight into exile in 1959, the Chinese forces occupying Tibet were not concerned with economic development. Their main aim was to consolidate their position within the region.
During the 1960s, China itself underwent severe political upheaval with the advent of the Cultural Revolution. The 1970s saw a thawing of US relations with China and so began China’s slow progress towards a more open economy. During the 1980s and 1990s, China’s economy enjoyed unprecedented growth as it was underpinned by government intervention. “The Chinese gradualist approach avoided the pitfall of rampant inflation that had marked the shock therapies of Russia and other countries under the tutelage of the IMF” (Stiglitz, 2002: 183). At the same time the Chinese began to invite foreign companies to establish joint ventures which led to China becoming the “largest recipient of foreign direct investments among the emerging markets” (Stiglitz, 2002: 183). In order to meet the demands of its growing economy and needs for raw material, China embarked on the plundering of Tibet for these resources.
Ethnic Tibet is a large country of some 2.5 million square kilometres. With a population of only six million Tibetans, and a range of hitherto unexploited natural resources, China saw Tibet as an economic treasure-house. To accommodate their growing population, the PRC introduced a policy of offering economic incentives for young Chinese citizens migrating to Tibet, so that today, in all the major cities, Tibetans have become a minority in their own country. The PRC’s exploitation of Tibet’s natural environment has caused severe damage.
The Chinese government has secured ongoing foreign investment inside Tibet. Such investments and economic development is not based on any regard for the needs of indigenous Tibetans, nor for the consequences of such development on their material, social, cultural, environmental and fundamental human rights. As in Burma, the local population has no input into the course of developmental strategies being implemented inside their country. This situation is in direct violation of the 1986 UN Declaration on the Right to Development, which stipulates: “the right and duty of states to formulate appropriate developmental policies that aim at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population and all individuals, on the basis of their active, free and meaningful participation.”
The Chinese claim that their development plans and projects do benefit the Tibetan population. In order to analyse this contention, the following few examples take note of the views and statistics given by the Chinese government and by the exiled Tibet government. It should be noted, however, that accurate statistical data is difficult to obtain, and even harder to confirm, because of the restrictions enforced by Chinese government officials on independent observers wishing to conduct research inside Tibet.
“We are helping Tibetans catch up with the West … It is not ‘Hanification’, but globalisation,” claims Ma Lihua, an authority on Tibet (South China Morning Post, 2004). According to the People’s Daily (Chinese newspaper) on 10 March 2000, the GDP of Tibet in 1999 was 10.335 billion yuan, a rise of 9.1% from that of the previous year. The report claims that the growth rate in the region had exceeded the national average level for six consecutive years. Industrial output saw a rise of 7.8% in 1999. The report states that there has been a vast improvement in the livelihoods of farmers and herdsmen, and for the urban community a rise of 8.6% in their disposable income. The report does not differentiate between Chinese and Tibetans living in the urban areas, but when one considers that there are more Chinese than Tibetans in the towns and cities, it is safe to deduce that such an increase in disposable income refers mostly that enjoyed by the Chinese populace.
The PRC claims that poverty amongst Tibetans has been reduced from 480 000 to 210 000, as cited in a Chinese development booklet. The publication says that Tibet has “… gone from a closed to open society, from a traditional to a modern economy” (New Star Publishers, 1998: 1). A further report from the Chinese Embassy in the US (2001) reiterates China’s claim that its development strategies in Tibet have benefited the indigenous people. It is interesting and most ironic that these reports refer to “de-colonisation” and the “drive of the Third World towards modernisation” after the “imperialist invasion and control of Tibet”, in staggering defiance, or at least nonchalant dismissal, of the PRC’s own actions and stance in Tibet.
The PRC report claims that the direction of its intervention inside Tibet has led to regional growth. This may be true, but visibly, this growth has been targeted solely towards the PRC’s enrichment and empowerment, and the improved livelihoods of the Chinese living in Tibet. For this reason, the Tibet government in-exile and a number of international human rights organisations and Tibet Support Groups (TSGs) do not deny that development is taking place inside Tibet: their concern is the kind of development taking place and its beneficiaries.
The Tibet government-in-exile (TGIE) states that if the data published by China were true, then in reality the whole of Tibet should be:
… one of the most economically developed regions in China, yet the growing number of refugees escaping Tibet, and their testimonies, seem to indicate that while there has been a notable economic growth in Tibet, especially in the urban areas, this has principally benefited the Chinese settlers. (Tibet Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, 2000: 1)
Instead, the refugees report food shortages, animal limits on farmers, the expulsion or forced removal of rural Tibetans from their land, high taxes and no job prospects.
This report claims there has been little genuine alleviation of poverty in rural Tibet, with most Tibetans living in the Tibet Autonomous Region on less than half a dollar a day. As the International Commission of Jurists noted in 1997: “In the 1990s, nearly all Tibetans continue to exist at subsistence level, their lives little touched by China’s massive investment in Tibetan infrastructure and superstructure” (Tibet Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, 2000: 18).
A development strategy formulated at the Third National Forum on Works in Tibet, which was convened in Beijing in 1994, further impoverished the Tibetans. The Forum encouraged the idea of “… [opening] Tibet’s door wide to inner parts of the country and encourag[ing] traders, investment, economic units and individuals from China to Central Tibet to run different sorts of enterprises” (TCHRD, 2000: 21). The implementation of this policy has had a devastating effect on all Tibetans. Not only have they become marginalised in their own country but have lost what little economic inclusion they already had under the existing laws governed by the Chinese. Nearly all businesses are owned by the Chinese, so that whatever spending money Tibetans do have has to be spent on day-to-day commodities, both made in China and sold by the Chinese.
This inequality of income distribution is growing at a rapid pace and there is little chance of the economy supporting material convergence for indigenous Tibetans with the Chinese settlers. Arthur Holcombe, President of the Tibet Poverty Alleviation Fund, in his report to the US Congress confirmed the TGIE claims that development in Tibet was aimed towards wellbeing of Tibet’s Chinese residents and PRC projects. Holcombe states that “… the increasing income disparity between urban and rural areas …” continues. The Chinese government admitted that in 1996, the average per capita family income in urban areas of Tibet was $606, while rural families earned $117. An example of such inequality in micro-economic enterprises is that of the Tibetan handicraft industry. This industry is the most basic means of income-generation for all indigenous Tibetans, yet out of a total of 340 handicraft industries in Lhasa (the capital of Tibet), only 28 are owned by Tibetans (International Campaign for Tibet, 2002).
The construction of railways was a characteristic feature in nearly all colonised or occupied countries. The railway provides not only the means of transporting economic goods quickly and efficiently but also a means of gaining political control throughout the occupied country. The People’s Republic of China hopes to open, in 2007, the first railway line that will link Tibet with China. Known at the Qinghai-Tibet Railway, this project has turned into a developmental disaster for the Tibetans. The PRC has been heavily criticised for its lack of concern for the local environment and the Tibetans living along the proposed route.
However, the Chinese are weathering this storm; for them, the railway is more of a strategic and political accomplishment than an economically directed project. Once completed, it will provide a faster means for more Chinese to enter Tibet and to reach a greater number of isolated locations not yet claimed by the PRC. It will provide them with a more efficient means of exporting Tibet’s raw material to China for processing and sale in the global economy. Finally, the railway will not only consolidate China’s grip on and within Tibet, but will augment the PRC’s strategic (especially military) dominance in Asia.
It cannot be denied that China has brought modernisation to Tibet, but this illegal, unsolicited, non-participatory and exclusionist “development” has brought nothing but suffering to the Tibetan nation. They have seen their country overwhelmed by Han Chinese settlers, and their subsistence mode of living overtaken by technology. Instead of reaping the benefits of the Chinese “liberation from serfdom”, the Tibetans have become nothing more than an irritating under-class for the Chinese. Since the 1990s, the PRC has perceived and propagated development in and on its own terms: i.e. the growth of Chinese-operated businesses, major developmental projects and the welcomed investment of foreign corporations inside Tibet.
The TGIE states that the poverty and marginalisation endured by Tibetans in their own country can only be halted by international intervention. However, unlike the case of Burma, because of China’s global political and economic strength, it is unlikely that sanctions will be imposed on the PRC. With China’s membership of the World Trade Organisation, ethnic Tibetan farmers will face more difficult regulations as stipulated by the WTO’s rules. In Caucan, 2003, WTO rules stated that tariffs on cereal grains and oil seeds would be reduced to 3% and 3.9% respectively (The Canada Tibet Committee, 2003).
By enabling China’s admission to other international institutions and granting her “favoured nation” status, the international community seems not to realise that such empowerment for China effectively disables Tibetans in every sphere of life inside Tibet, forcing them to seek what little refuge they can in India or other countries. Unless the rapid modernisation of Tibet affords the Tibetans the opportunity of economic self-reliance, the fears of the TGIE that the indigenous Tibetan nation will become extinct might well become a reality.
Conclusion
The post-WW2 period has seen most Asian countries successfully adapt to their independence, both politically and economically. The People’s Republic of China, the largest communist country in the world, has adopted a pseudo-capitalist system, opening its markets for export and foreign income, but only on its own terms. Because of the immense potential for profits, international corporations and governments have ignored the distortion of economic development in Burma or Tibet and the damage caused by these programmes to the vast majority of the Burmese and Tibetan populations.
This essay has examined the development failures of two Asian countries. Burma has become isolated to the extent that the World Bank has, since 1987, refused to make new loans to the country. The Burmese ruling military junta is using the country’s natural resources to bargain for protection, mainly from the PRC, and as a result, the Chinese have become the wealthiest minority group in Burma. For Tibet, the situation is even more tragic, with the World Bank and other institutions continuing to fund PRC-run developmental programmes in full knowledge that indigenous Tibetans will not benefit from these outputs. The Chinese presence spreads and thickens within Tibet year by year, as huge amounts of natural resources and vast expanses of land are either destroyed or exploited to support the PRC’s territorial agenda.
There is no authentic free market system in either of these two countries, and even if there were, the vast majority of Burmese and Tibetans would not have an equal opportunity of access to them. In these respective instances, the Keynesian approach to the market is being abused by governments that are politically and morally corrupt. The Marxist view of a fair economy based on co-operation could be the alternative road for genuine development in these two countries.
For both Burma and Tibet, there is only one possible route towards socio-political change, which would in turn lead to sustainable growth and more equitable access to economic opportunity. In Burma, the only viable focus for social activism, at this stage, would be that of securing democratic elections and governance. For Tibet, only a combined movement involving the support and intervention of international governments and TSGs, (which would defend and protect indigenous social activism within Tibet) might lead the PRC to review its economic and development policies in Tibet. Ways to encourage the Chinese to devise more participatory and consultative programmes would need to be identified and promoted.
It seems to the writer that, whilst there are suitable developmental models for policies and programmes that could adequately address the unique social issues in and consequently uplift the economies of Burma and Tibet, these cannot be introduced or implemented unless dramatic political transformation occurs within their respective societies.
REFERENCES
Introduction:
Myrdal, Gunnar 1968. The Asian Drama -An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations.
London: Penguin Books
Painikkar, K.M. 1953. Asia and Western Dominance. London: Allen and Unwin Ltd
Burma
Booth, Anne. 2003. The Burma Developmental Disaster in Comparative Historical Perspective. London: SOAS Bulletin of Burma Research. 1(1) www.burmacampaign.org.uk
Downloaded 1 April 2004
Burma Campaign UK. 2002. London. www.burmacampaign.org.uk Downloaded 1 April 2004
Burma Campaign UK. 2004. The European Union and Burma. The Case for Targeted Sanctions.
London: Burma Campaign UK www.burmacampaign.org.uk Downloaded 1 April 2004
Chua, Amy 2003. World on Fire. UK: William Henierman
Cook, Paul and Minogue, Martin. 1993. ‘Economic Reform and Political Change in Myanmar (Burma).’ World Development. 21(7) 1151 – 1160
McGrew, Anthony and Brook, Christopher. 1998. Asia-Pacific in the New World Order.
London: Routledge
South African Department of Foreign Affairs. 2003 South African Relations with Mayanmar. South Africa: Department of Foreign Affairs, 2003 www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/bilateral/myanmar.html Downloaded 1 April 2004
Tibet
Embassy of PRC – USA. 2001. White paper on Tibet’s March Toward Modernisation.
Washington Embassy of PRC – USA, 11 August 2001
www.china-embassy.org Downloaded 1 April 2004
International Campaign for Tibet. 2002. Statement of Arthur N. Holocombe,
President, Tibet Poverty Alleviation Fund. Washington, 10 June 2002
www.savetibet.org Downloaded 25 March 2004
New Star Publishers 1998. Farewell to Poverty. China: New Star Publishers
South China Morning Post 2004. ‘Beijing helping Tibetans catch up’. 28 January 2004
Stiglitz, Joseph. 2002. Globalisation and its Discontents. London: Penguin Group
The Canada Tibet Committee. 2003. Tibet’s Rural Economy Threatened by WTO Rules.
Canada: The Canada Tibet Committee, 12 September 2003 www.wtn-editors@tibet.ca
Downloaded 1 April 2004
Tibet Centre for Human Rights and Democracy 2000. Improvising Tibetans – China’s flawed economic policy in Tibet. India: Tibet Centre for Human Rights and Democracy
Tibetan Parliamentary & Policy Research Centre 1998. The Case Concerning Tibet.
India: International Committee for Tibet
