By Himanshu Thakkar
Will India effectively use diplomacy, its only option now, when the Chinese President visits Delhi?
China’s plans to divert water from the Brahmaputra River to the Yellow river in northwest China is once again in news, though China’s foreign ministry spokesperson has said there is no such project. The site of the proposed dam is said to be the Shuomatan point in the Himalayan region of China, where this mighty river takes a spectacular U-turn. This is geologically highly fragile terrain, being the meeting point of the Indian plate with the Eurasian plate.
The dam would have far reaching implications for India and Bangladesh. Floods and droughts in the Brahmaputra basin would go beyond both India’s and Bangladesh’s control. India’s planned big hydropower projects in the Brahmaputra basin would suffer a serious setback. The only indisputably water surplus river of India’s River Linking Plan would be left with very little surplus water.
The Great Western Route Water Diversion Project envisages the diversion of 200 billion cubic metres of water every year from three rivers—Yarlung Zangbo (the Brahmaputra), Nu (Mekong) and Lancang (Salween)—to the Yellow River. The project that would cost more than the $25 billion Three Gorges project, might be built in 2010 and is reportedly backed by the Chinese President Hu Jintao.
The project has been talked about in the media since June 1996 when the project was first reported in the Scientific American. Interestingly, China’s minister for water resources Wang Shucheng reportedly poured cold water on the proposal on October 24, calling it “unnecessary, not feasible and unscientific.” But, his further clarification could have other meanings: “as a minister, I won’t comment on whether it’s possible to realise the proposal in the long run.”
He added, “We must keep an eye on possible floods when the Yellow River has 58 BCM of water. If another 50 BCM, not to mention 200 BCM, is poured in, I am sure all the dams and protection embankments will be destroyed immediately. The cost of diverting one cubic metre of water from the central and eastern routes of the south-north project would be about 10 yuan. From the western route—the Yalong, Dadu and Jinsha rivers—it would cost about 20 yuan ($2.5), but diverting water from the Yarlung Zangbo would be far more costly. These costs are far higher than the three yuan per cubic metre cost of technologies to conserve water.”
Currently, India has very little leverage with China, which is known to go ahead with projects that affect downstream areas, without consulting or even informing those affected.
On October 25, the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson said, “China has no plans to build a dam and divert water from Yarlung Zangbo to the Yellow river.” He cryptically said he had no further information. Meanwhile, Claude Arpi, the author of The Fate of Tibet, wrote earlier this month that in August 2006, the director of the Yellow River Water Conservancy Committee, Li Guoying, had confirmed China’s plans to divert Tibet’s water to the mainland.
Note that India has no water sharing treaty with China, and does not seem to have even taken the issue seriously, while China has barely bothered about the downstream implications of its actions.
India still does not know the cause of the floods in Arunachal Pradesh in June 2000 that originated from China. The flash floods killed many and destroyed property on a large scale—for no apparent reason, as the area had no rainfall. Nor does India know the cause of floods in the Sutlej basin in Himachal Pradesh in July-August 2000, which also originated from China. Here, the damage was on an even bigger scale and again there was no apparent reason, as the rainfall in the area was not high.
Until early this year, India did not know that China had built a hydropower project in the upstream Sutlej basin in China. China did not bother to inform India about it. Now it seems China may be building more hydropower projects on various tributaries of the Sutlej.
The character of silt in the Sutlej has changed in the last five years, claim the authorities at the 1,500 mw-Nathpa Jhakri Project in HP. The project is facing serious problems due to the high content of abrasive silt in the Sutlej. It had to be shut down for over three weeks this year and six weeks last year due to this.
When the problem posed by the Pareechhu lake in Tibet in the Sutlej basin came to light in 2005, China was not particularly cooperative in helping India investigate the parameters and implications of the lake.
It is clear that India has very little leverage with China on these issues at present. China is known to go ahead with projects that affect downstream areas, without consulting, or even informing, the downstream countries about the same. This is evident from the Mekong example, but is also known to India from the Sutlej example quoted above.
China did not consult or inform India before constructing the hydropower project on Sutlej. China admitted its existence only after it was presented a fait accompli. There is the UN convention on non-navigable use of waters (1997), but China has not ratified it. So, going to the International Court of Justice under the convention is not an option. The World Commission on Dams had suggested detailed guidelines for sharing of water from trans boundary rivers, but the Indian government had rejected its report. The only option now is diplomacy—we have to wait and see how this is used. The Indian government has confirmed that the issue will be raised when the Chinese President visits Delhi in the coming weeks.
Past experience has shown that China’s denial of the project cannot be taken too seriously. Only time will tell if we are able to act effectively to address our concerns.
The writer is with South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers and People
