By Arabinda Ghose
A few days ago, towards the end of June 2006, a multi-edition Delhi-based newspaper published a story along with a purported satellite picture of a barrage-like structure coming up across the Parichu river in Tibet, also known in local language as the Langchen Khambab river.
The river originates from the Rakas lake in the vicinity of the Mansarovar lake in Tibet, considered holy by the Hindus, and flows westwards towards Himahcal Pradesh in India. Entering India through the Shipki La pass, the river takes the name of the Satluj (ancient name Shatadru), one of the five rivers of Punjab.
Although the Ministry of External Affairs is yet to comment on this development, water resources engineers of India have expressed concern over this development, particularly because of the fact that the huge Bhakra Dam and the reservoir formed by the dam across the Satluj, is a virtual life line for north-western India since it provides irrigation water, flood control and large hydro-electric power.
Granted the fact that a barrage is actually a diversion structure and does not store water like dams do, any such structure upstream of a river that flows through strategic areas in India makes some people jittery, more so because the Parichu river has been a source of constant worry to engineers managing the 1500 Megawatt (MW) Nathpa Jhakri hydro-electric power station across the Satluj near Rampur in Himachal Pradesh, which has cost the exchequer more than Rs. 8600 crores to build and has started generating power only less than two years ago.
Before we go into other aspects of this piece of information, it is relevant here to discuss whether India would at all be justified in raising the issue with the Chinese authorities formally on a legal basis. In other words, is China legally bound to inform and consult India before undertaking the construction of barrage or even a dam? The answer to this question would be a resounding NO.
Attempts have been made for decades to frame a law with regard to the “non-navigational use of water courses” on the same lines as the legal principles governing navigational use of water courses. The latter was codified quite sometime ago since cross-border inland navigation and timber floating were important to many countries. It was slower to develop with regard to non-navigational uses as water resources development entailing large storage and diversions were largely a product of 19th century technology. The verdicts of courts and tribunals in large countries with federal characteristics like the United States and India established a body of case laws as a guide to action. For example, the Helsinki Rules of the International Law Association, a non-governmental body, won considerable acclaim when it was enunciated in 1966.
This, however, remained a non-binding convention though evolved by an influential professional body without State representation. This prompted the United Nations to attempt to codify a set of principles in relation to codify a set of principles in relation to international water regulation. The International Law Commission was assigned the task in 1970.After years of labour, it presented a Draft Framework Convention to the General Assembly which finally adopted the Convention on the Non-navigational Uses of International Water Courses in May 1997 by 104 votes to 3 (including China) with 26 abstentions (including India and Pakistan). Bhutan was not present.
India, therefore is not bound to inform other countries when it undertakes development of water courses for non-navigational purposes and so is China. India had, voluntarily, discussed the issue regarding Farakka after East Pakistan had become Bangladesh and the Indus Waters Treaty was brokered by the World Bank in 1960.
(This portion and some other information have been gleaned from the Report of the Working Group IX of the National Commission for Integrated Water Resources Development Plan instituted in 1996 by the then Prime Minister H. D. Deve Gowda. This working group was led by well known water resources expert B.G. Verghese and the present writer was a member of it).
It is not very well known in the rest of the country that on the early hours of August 1,2000, a flash flood had occurred in the Parichu, which was carried into the Sutlej from a place called Khab on the border of Himachal Pradesh with Tibet, at about 0100 hours on August 1 and had reached the Nathpa Jhakri Project at about 0515 hrs. Within a short span of time the level of the river Satluj rose by 15 metres and the water discharge rose suddenly from 1480 cumec (cubic metre per second) at 0300 hours to 5100 cumecs by 0530 hrs. It had come down to just 1416 cumec by 0900 hrs. There was, however, no flood in the river Spiti which joins the Satluj near Khab.
According to one report by a team of engineers connected with the Bhakra Nangal Project, “the devastating flood which gained momentum as it passed down the river from the heights of Kinnaur district destroyed almost everything on its way including the costly infrastructures thus pushing back the clock of development by several decades. It resulted in a loss of lots of life and property, disrupting services such as power, water supply and telecommunication in the flood-affected areas of Kinnaur, Shimla and Mandi districts of Himachal Pradesh. More than 150 people were swept away, several were buried under the huge mass of rubble and the area had remained inaccessible for several days. About 50 bridges from Khab to Sunni and about 50 km of the Hindustan-Tibet Road. the lifeline of the Lahaul-Spiti district, were washed away The damages to the highway had a tremendous impact on the economy of the area with apple, peas and other cash crops remained in the area ,although normally they are exported outside.
The Nathpa Jhakri project, then under construction, was damaged by the backflow of water in the tailrace tunnel. Tonnes of rubble and silt were deposited on the generating units. The Project had suffered a loss of about Rs.700 crores. The total loss because of the flood was estimated at Rs.2500 crores then.
An inquiry into the accident had concluded then had said that the probable cause was “Glacial Lake Outburst Flow and a cloud burst at the same time in the catchment area of the Parichu in Tibet. The reason why the rest of India, particularly the Punjab cities and towns like Ludhiana did not feel the impact of this flash flood was that the Bhakra Dam’s Gobindsagar reservoir with a capacity of 9868 million cubic foot absorbed all the flood waters. Even in 2004,when a similar flash flood had stopped generation of power at the Nathpa Jhakri Project, the Bhakra Beas Management Board had welcomed the inflow into the reservoir.
Although, therefore, the construction of the “barrage” does not immediately pose a threat to the Satluj river and the string of hydel projects on it in Himachal Pradesh, danger can be from the Tibetan side if a report published in the Scientific American magazine of the United Sates in June 1996.The report had stated that Chinese engineers had been telling the Chinese Academy of Sciences in December 1995 that the waters of the Upper Barahmaputra could be diverted into the arid northwest region of China and the Gobi desert through peaceful nuclear explosion. There was no follow up of this report and so that danger appears to have been averted.
There is however another fear that some volume of water of the Yarlungzangbo (the Brahmaputra) could be diverted into the Arun river of Nepal or the Gandaki in the same country. Both these rivers later flow into India, the former as part of the Sapta Kosi and the latter as the Gandak, Both rivers have been harnessed jointly by Nepal and India.
There is a positive side too, although it is really futuristic and a “dream”, of harnessing the immense potential of the Brahmaputra as it takes a U-bend from Tibet to Arunachal Pradesh and Assam, dropping almost 8000 feet in the process. Japan’s Electric Power Development Corporation did a desk-top study of a possible Upper Brahmaputra cascade with a resulting dam south of Lhasa and a series of power stations below that, crowned by two alternative Tibet-to-Assam tunnel projects to generate 48,000 to 54,000 MW at one of other of these sites alone. The largest hydro-electric plant in the world today is the Three Gorges plant in China across the Yangtse with an ultimate installed capacity of 18,200 MW.
