By Ngawang Namgyal
With the downfall of Chiang Kiashek’s government and the rise of communist regime in China, there had been a major transformation in China. The regime, in the name of liberation, began to repress not only the Chinese but also the Tibetan people with an announcement from Peking and Ziling to carry out “liberation” of Tibet from foreign imperialists, and provoking treason against their government. Unlike the Chiang Kiashek’s government who focussed more on Sino-Tibet border disputes rather than emphasizing Tibet as being part of China, it also began to vocally claim that Tibet was a part of China on an unsubstantiable basis. The Chiang Kiashek government’s claim of sovereignty over Tibet, if any of worth attending to, was just based upon the Republican President Yuan Shikai’s claim for revival the patron-priest relationship between Tibet and China but with the added interest for a greater degree of China’s influence on Tibet, on the basis of recent Chao Er-feng’s triumph in occupying certain part of Tibet, and hatching a scheme of converting that part of Tibetan area into Chinese province, which the then Emperor, in view of the patron-priest relationship, was known to have discouraged. Besides that, it was just prompted by the China’s close relationship with Britain who had trade interest in Tibet and also the need for preventing Russia’s expansion.
Following the radio announcement made by China to “liberate” Tibet, and provoking a treason inside Tibet, the Tibetan government made an appeal denying that any such Chinese help for liberation was not necessary for Tibet, as no foreign aggressors existed in Tibet, and asking not to make any such threat that had deeply affected the people. With Chinese communist attack ever ready for an onslaught, and great hustle and bustles in Tibet, the Tibetan officials, in the hope of coming to an understanding with the Chinese, held a discussion and sent a delegation to a Sino-Tibetan border area, and left Lhasa in February 1950, and arrived in India the following month. In India, after making contact with Peking for sending a delegation at a place near border of China, the Chinese suggested that they would send a delegation to Hongkong, and they should meet there, leaving aside the pretension that they were foreigners. They obtained the visa to go to Hongkong for holding the talk, but they failed to make the actual journey at Calcutta, as the British government did not have any information about the proposal. When they made contacts with the Indian government, Foreign Secretary and British High Commissioner told them that, as the new Chinese Envoy would be arriving in India with the establishment of their Consul office, they could hold talks in India itself. From China, the same advice came that they were aware of the situation of denial of permit, and they could hold talks with new Chinese Envoy arriving in Delhi shortly. However, not keeping their own word, the Chinese troops from Szechuan area, attacked Denkhog in June 1950, which was following the occupation of Dartsedo and some other eastern Tibetan border areas earlier. Ngabo was appointed Kalon and made the new Governor of Dokham, by the Tibetan government, replacing Tsewang Dorjee. Ngabo led the battle from the Tibetan side.
In August 1950, China sought India’s recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, in place of the usual ‘suzerainty’, from K.M. Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador to China at Peking. He made representation with the Chinese government, and accepted China’s sovereignty over Tibet which could be understood from the statements he made later. Before obtaining the representation, China had admitted that she would “liberate” Tibet, and also abstain from the use of force. The Ambassador obviously lacked adequate information about the real ongoing situation about Chinese troops intrusion inside Tibet, as he stated to the effect in a later statement, and surely the breach of trust. Under the process, China obtained a legitimacy which, as we are aware of, was, by any calculation, not to fulfil the stated objective of India with its gradual adaptation to the new stand. Earlier in January 1950, India had given formal recognition to the Communist government of China.
With the delegation’s arrival at Delhi from Calcutta on September 4, they again met with India’s External Minister. During the meeting, the External Minister told them that as he saw in newspapers that a large Chinese troops were coming into Tibet from different borders, he had appealed China through Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador to China at Peking, that the occupation of small country like Tibet would provoke worldwide rebuff, as he heard that China was invading in the border areas of Tibet. On September 6, 1950, as per earlier decision, and with anxiety increased due to the United Kingdom, the USA, and Nepal, not responding to the request for sending a delegation, the Tibetan delegation held discussions with the Assistant Chinese Envoy, who had arrived at Delhi.
On September 16, 1950, they held meeting with the Chinese Envoy himself, to whom, they told that Tibetan independence should be respected, and patron-priest relationship between Tibet and China should be strengthened. No foreign influence, be it that of British, America, or Chiang Kiashek regime existed in Tibet, and Tibet was governed by the Tibetan leader Dalai Lama himself. The Envoy told them that the assertion of independent status of Tibet should be given up, trade missions and foreign relations pertaining to political matters, should take place through China, and that China would protect Tibet. If accepted these terms, no war would take place, otherwise war was inevitable. The Indian govt intervened for arriving at an agreement between the two but in vain. The Tibetan delegations informed Lhasa about it, but finding themselves in a state of dilemma, nothing concrete could be offered in reply to the Chinese.
On October 7, 1950, the Chinese troops were able to launch a wide-ranging attack on Chamdo, the headquarter of Governor of Dokham, as per an early plan and although the talk was going on at Delhi with the Chinese Communist Envoy. On October 19, 1950, Chamdo came under complete Chinese occupation. Ngabo, the Governor of Dokham was captured, and as asked by the Chinese General, he sent two men to Lhasa to inform that a delegation for negotiation be sent at Chamdo. The ongoing talks by the previous group of delegation in Delhi was stopped. The Chinese general threatened that if no delegation was sent for a peaceful negotiation, then the attack would continue. On October 26, 1950, after the loss of Tibetan government’s Radio station in Chamdo, no accurate information on the eastern front could be received by the Tibetan government at Lhasa.
As soon as the news about the event reached India, a note was dispatched by the Indian government to China, expressing concern, and suggesting that the use of force would be harmful to them. Another note was also sent saying that they broke the promises made to them earlier. On October 31, 1950, in reply to China’s allegation that the Indian govt. was infected by foreign influences hostile to China, the government stated that a settlement of the Tibetan problem might be possible on the basis of Tibetan autonomy under Chinese suzerainty. The Tibetan autonomy was a fact, and the Chinese military operations against Tibet was unprovoked and unjustifiable, and it was going back on the promises made to India. It also expressed the wish for continuity of the India’s existing rights in Tibet based upon the Simla Agreement, but it came to no result, because China said that no”unequal treaties”, referring to 1914 British-Tibet treaty, could be allowed to stand, and the issue of Tibet was a domestic affair of China.
On November 17, 1950, after assumption of State responsibility by the 14th Dalai Lama, two assistances were sent for Ngabo at Chamdo, as per earlier appeal made to Tibetan government after the occupation of Chamdo by China. But, the Chinese immediately changed the venue. So, the Tibetan government sent two additional members and they, accordingly, went to Peking. On April 22, 1951, Ngabo and the members arrived in Peking. During the first session of meeting held on April 29, 1951, the Tibetan delegations requested for the withdrawal of the invading Chinese troops from Tibet, saying that it created difficulty for residence and security of the Dalai Lama at Lhasa. This was turned down.
On May 2, 1951, when the second session of meeting was held, the Tibetan delegation stressed that the intrusion of the Chinese troops inside should be the main issue to be discussed. The Chinese counterpart said that the marching of troops inside Tibet was their determined stand. On May 7, 1951, the third session of meeting was held, where the Tibetan delegation repudiated a 10-point proposal made by the Chinese earlier. They also, as per a proposal which sought clear agreement from the Chinese to agree to stop violent military intervention, and any required social reforms in Tibet could be made by the Tibetans. When the Tibetan troops obtained strength as the PLA, they would guard their own country, and that the Chinese should compensate for the loss and support them towards that end.
On May 10, 1951, the Chinese counterpart rejected the May 7 Tibetan proposals. A discussion on a draft of Agreement was held, but the Tibetans were unyielding from their stand. In the end, the Chinese counterpart said that if they refused to sign the Agreement, or to do as what they were told, the troops would further intrude inside Tibet, and become more violent. On May 23, 1951, the 17-point Agreement was made to sign, obviously under a duress. The seal was forged by the Chinese, as Ngabo refused to sign with the Governor’s seal he had carried with him. Back at Lhasa, the Tibetan delegation made the statement in the National Assembly meeting that they were forced to sign the Agreement under threat of further military attacks in Tibet, as the Chinese troops were already in occupation of Chamdo, and ready to renew operation beyond it at any moment. But in the hope of peace and normalcy in a region abandoned by the world, the Agreement was left to remain in force.
However, early in 1952, the Chinese themselves, with the success in bringing military into Tibet as per the Agreement, began to violate it, demanding a change in the existing political system of Tibet. Also, there had been violation of other provisions of the Agreement by the Chinese in Tibet. The Tibetan efforts at carrying out reforms in Tibet were discouraged, which was expected by the Tibetans to be made, as per the wish of the Tibetan people, not just by the previous Dalai Lama, but also by the present Dalai Lama. In view of such Chinese violation of the Agreement, in addition to its being forced to sign under duress, the Dalai Lama, in 1959, repudiated the Agreement at Tezpur, India, during his coming into exile.
Oblivious to the fact of violation of its provisions, the Agreement or treaty was later used by China with Nepal and India in her dealing on matters having relevance with Tibet. Most astutely, after the subsequent complete occupation of Tibet by China, the treaty made China to act as a party to the common border issues with Tibet. The new legitimacy gained from the treaty had been used for rescinding or changing the spirit of the earlier treaties signed by these neighbouring countries with Tibet, and harping on matters relating to the border “disputes”, and thus putting pressures upon them. In a nutshell, China received and enjoyed great benefit from the treaty which provided them with such authority as their expansionist zeal would permit to have for themselves.
