“Broad prospects for various cooperation”.
A move by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to repel the influence of the Dalai Lama in a Tibetan Buddhist region has become apparent during the visit to Kalmykia, in the Russian Federation, from 21 to 25 June 2004, of an eight-member delegation from the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR). The delegation was headed by Jampa Phuntsog (Chin: Qiangba Puncog), head of TAR People’s Government (Governor), and accompanied by Liu Guchang, Ambassador of PRC to Moscow, and four other embassy staff. The visit attracted media attention because on 22 June 2004, a planned visit to the Sakyusun Sume temple was cancelled after the delegation demanded the removal of portraits of the Dalai Lama from the temple before they would enter. The head of the Kalmyk Buddhist Union, Telo Rinpoche refused the delegation’s demands.
Kalmykia, situated on the northwest coast of the Caspian Sea, between the Volga and the Don rivers, has a population of 316 000 people, out of which 45.4 % (i.e. 160,000) are Kalmyks. The Kalmyks belong to a Western Mongolian tribe called Oirats that left the Western Mongolian province of Dzungaria (today incorporated into Xinjiang in the PRC) and established themselves in South Russia after their princes swore allegiance to the Russian crown in 1609.
Despite the large geographical distance (approx. 5,000km), the Kalmyks have maintained close ties with Tibet throughout the centuries. Like other Mongols, they became followers of Tibetan Buddhism during two waves of conversion, first in the 13th century and then in the 16-17th century. Kalmyk khans (princes) received edicts legitimizing their rule from the Dalai Lamas. Many Kalmyk monks studied in Tibetan monasteries, mainly in Drepung near Lhasa, and Kalmyks made pilgrimages to Lhasa and other holy places in Tibet. Since 1898, a representative of the Dalai Lama has made regular visits to the Kalmyk steppes.
The experience of Buddhists in Kalmykia during the 20th century in many ways mirrors the fate of Tibetans. Under communist rule, Buddhism was brutally suppressed and purges destroyed all the monasteries but one. Nevertheless, like the Tibetans, Kalmyks practiced Buddhism secretly and preserved their specific Buddhist traditions and rituals and, like Tibet after Deng Xiaoping’s reform policies, Gorbachev’s perestroika brought a revitalisation of Kalmyk Buddhism, starting in 1988 when the first Buddhist community was registered in Elista, the capital of Kalmykia. Once more, young people were sent to study in various Buddhist institutions, in particular to Dharamsala the seat of exile of the Dalai Lama in India.
In October 1996, the Saksyusun Sume monastery, (known as Gendun Shedrup Choekhorling in Tibetan,) was opened in the presence of more than 30,000 people. The Kalmyk Buddhists felt particularly honoured to have had the Dalai Lama, during his first visit to the region in 1991, bless the foundations of what has become the centre of Buddhism in Kalmykia. He paid a second visit to the region in 1992 and, in anticipation of future visits, a pavilion has been built within the monastery complex to house him.
Kirsan Nikolayevich Illyumzhinov, the president of Kalmykia, arranged the PRC delegation’s trip during a goodwill visit to the TAR in autumn 2003. The delegation was largely composed of Tibetans, including the highest Tibetan leader in the TAR, Jampa Phuntsog, though the Tibetans were chaperoned by Chinese ambassador Liu and his entourage. Xinhua reported Liu claiming during the visit: “Kalmyk people have a similar historical origin and common customs and habits with the Chinese”. While the first part of the statement about “similar historical origin” might refer to historical trade relationships, (and war,) between different Mongol people and mainland China, the second part about “common customs and habits” clearly applies to the close historical and cultural ties between Kalmyks and Tibetans, since Chinese (Han) and Kalmyks rarely had any common customs or habits. It is on the basis therefore, of its perception of Tibetans as Chinese that the PRC sees the potential for establishing “broad prospects for various cooperation” with the Kalmyks. However, the Chinese prospect of a “broad (…) cooperation” applies exclusively to ‘China’s Tibet’ and thus conflicts with the Kalmyks’ deep veneration for the Dalai Lama.
President Illyumzhinov has paid several visits to the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan refugee community in India but he has always been careful to maintain a clear separation between the spheres of religion and politics. He publicly welcomed the Dalai Lama’s departure from his call for full Tibetan independence to genuine autonomy, as well as the Chinese initiative of resuming contacts with him. He presents the example of his Republic of Kalmykia as a model for the viability of cultural autonomy and has proposed himself as mediator. Nevertheless, the PRC successfully petitioned the Russian authorities to prevent any visit by the Dalai Lama to Russian territory. Since 2001, the Russian Federation’s government have twice declined the Kalmyks’ request for a visa that would allow the Dalai Lama to visit Kalmykia. The second time, on 14 June 2004, was during the delegation’s stay in Moscow, a few days before they proceeded to Kalmykia. Ambassador Liu communicated triumphantly to the press, eclipsing any Russian foreign ministry statements: “The Russian government, in particular the Foreign Ministry, has forbidden the Dalai Lama, who is in favour of Tibet ceding from China, from travelling to Russia,” he said and added “His [the Dalai Lama’s] separatist activities are a destabilizing factor in our Tibet”.
The incident at the monastery at Sakyusun Sume marked the public climax of the delegation’s visit and has been reported as an emotional clash between involved parties. Indeed, appearing on photographs in the world media under a portrait of the Dalai Lama would be embarrassing for Tibetan delegates despatched by the PRC on a diplomatic mission. However, the incident can be seen as a public reminder that the Chinese authorities expect Kalmyks to comply with their core policies towards the Dalai Lama. It might also be seen as them ‘feeling the pulse’ (Chin. hào mài) to test the extent of Kalmyk compliance. Rather than a spontaneous emotional reaction, the incident can be interpreted as a staged demonstration of power. Telo Rinpoche’s refusal to remove the Dalai Lama’s portrait from the temple, and then for him to engage in an argument with Jampa Phuntsog, displayed the will and strength of the Kalmyks in defending their right to revere the Dalai Lama.
Telo Rinpoche (i) was born in Philadelphia in the USA the son of Kalmyk immigrants. At the age of seven, he was sent to India for a monastic education. The Dalai Lama recognised him as an incarnation and dispatched him, just 19 years old, to Elista where he became the Kalmyk Buddhists’ leader. Initially finding it difficult to integrate in Kalmykia, he abandoned monasticism and went back for two years to the US to live a secular life. However, in 1995, he returned with his Tibetan wife and their son and resumed his responsibilities. At present, he administers 27 temples and prayer houses. Besides his strong personality, as a man with a modern background and a foreigner, Telo Rinpoche is unlikely to be easily pressurised to comply with higher Russian interests.
Defending the decision not to issue a visa to the Dalai Lama, Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, said in a press statement that Moscow’s policy is “Guided by the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries and being aware of the sensitivity of the Tibet issue, we would not allow a visit by the Dalai Lama to Kalmykia at the invitation of a top official”. This means in practice that Russia could only allow its Kalmyk Buddhist citizens to host their spiritual leader if China had no objections to it. Kalmyk President Illyumzhinov criticised the Russian central government for the visa denial and he threatened that Kalmyk Buddhists may turn to the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation to contest this decision. Realistically though, his chances of success appear dim, since the Court is under the influence of the Executive and is hopelessly overburdened (ii) . A potential way for the Russian authorities to satisfy both the demands of the Kalmyks and those of the PRC is mentioned in the part of the Foreign Minister’s statement about not allowing a visit by the Dalai lama: “(…) at the invitation of a top official”. This suggests that an invitation of a purely religious nature, issued by religious authorities, could be more acceptable to the Russians. However, Ambassador Liu has stated: “When visiting any country, the Dalai Lama isn’t capable of exclusively engaging in religious activities without any kind of political undertones. As a rule, all of his foreign trips have political goals”. And indeed, even if the Dalai Lama did go to Kalmykia simply to perform prayers and rituals and refrained from any public statements, given the strong empathy with the Tibetans among Kalmyk Buddhists, grounded in their faith and their similar experiences during the 20th century, his very presence would represent a silent demonstration. The pavilion built for him in the monastery complex of Sakyusun Sume is thus likely to remain empty in foreseeable future.
Meanwhile, the PRC/TAR delegation met with President Illyumzhinov and the Kalmyk Parliament and visited the countryside promoting “broad prospects for various cooperation” with China. With Kalmyk newspapers suggesting that the visit might open new possibilities for closer ties and economic relations in the economically stagnant Kalmykia, better-educated and less religious Kalmyks may see opportunities in having closer contacts with China. A first project is in preparation at the Kalmyk Institute for Humanities and Applied Sciences which hosts a collection of historical documents related to the exchanges between Kalmyks and Tibetans. The Institute, a focus of Kalmyks’ interest in history, is a place that may start ‘cooperation’ very soon. Besides, the Chinese authorities agreed to build a place of cult for the memory of Kalmyk pilgrims. This is unlikely to host a portrait of the Dalai Lama.
(i) Telo Rinpoche, secular name Erdne Ombadykov, is regarded as the incarnation of the Indian Buddhist saint Tilopa (988-1069).
(ii) In the Constitutional Court created in 1991, the Federation Council, on the recommendation of the President, appoints nineteen judges for fifteen years. The present makeup of the Constitutional Court was formed in 1995 (with 10 judges elected in 1991 and 9 appointed for the office on the basis of the new Law in October 1994- February 2000). The court files more than ten thousand petitions annually.
