P.Stobdan
It’s difficult to assess whether border talks between India and China are moving in the right direction or whether they have been held hostage to some hard bargaining by China. Repeated Chinese incursions — as reported by the ITBP recently — indicate the complexities involved in the issue despite an official citation of “incremental progress” made on the niggling boundary issue.
The 2005 agreement between India and China inspired optimism but belligerent public posturing by Chinese officials — starting with ambassador Sun Yuxi’s statement, the denial of travel visa to an IAS officer and Beijing’s submission that “mere presence” of populated areas would not affect its claim — has dented the 10-point political road map for a lasting and mutually agreeable boundary settlement.
What prompted Beijing to backtrack from the 2005 guidelines for a “package settlement” remains puzzling. The issue however needs to be placed in context. Firstly, it came as a fallout of New Delhi’s 2003 acceptance that “Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) is part of China” without being mindful of the official inclusion of Arunachal by China as part of Z’ngnan (South Tibet) and Tawang as a part of TAR’s Sona County. Former PM Atal Behari Vajpayee’s stand on Sikkim and his willingness to forgo Chang-chenmo or Aksai Chin may have sufficiently prompted Beijing to bargain harder.
Beijing, it seems, is using Article IV-VI of the 2005 Guiding Principles to interpret what it understood of them. Cultural imperatives are especially important to any Chinese claims. Already, Tawang’s importance as the birthplace of the Sixth Dalai Lama, hence affecting Tibetan senti-ment is being aired repeatedly. Article V is particularly intricate and could complicate the Indian position. In a similar vein, China could also claim entire Ladakh as the Stak-tsang Lama, chief priest and the legal owner of Ladakh’s revenue land, is a Chinese national and lives in China.
Beijing has been edgy over India’s rising global profile and its growing comfort level with Washington. The Japanese inspired “axis of democracy” — a four-way dialogue between India, Japan, US and Australia — may have enraged it further. There is no sign of the Chinese media wrapping up its anti-India rhetoric either.
Beijing’s reassertion is also the result of a keen understanding of ground realities in Arunachal and Ladakh. Let us face it. Our border regions are politically neglected and underdeveloped. The delay in border settlement will make the cross-border disparity starker. With the railway coming in, Tibetan economy seems to be booming with a 13.2 per cent growth rate as compared to the subsidy-based rationed economy on this side of the divide. More interestingly, the Himalayan people no longer seem to have antipathy for China.
New Delhi’s acce-lerated development plan along the LAC i.e., linking Shyok, Murgo, Daulat Beg Oldi and Spanggur with roads will make little sense unless the vast tracts of land are settled with people. In contrast, the Chinese have since long initiated a stabilising programme while building a transport network and infrastructure in areas they occupied in 1962. In the last two years, the Chinese have moved closer to the LAC, stepping up activities along the entire Khak-jung area across Charding-nala (Demchok), Shingon-nala (Fugtse), Dumtsele, Chushul, Spanggur, Phobrang and Hot Springs. This indicates that the Chinese are applying the “settlement principle” to consolidate their position. The immediate impact is the shrinking of grazing areas for Indian Changpas, something the Indian government is simply not interested in.
The Chinese thrive on taking advantage of India’s weaknesses and having killed the nuclear deal, they would now want to further corner India. Which is why the forthcoming visit by the Indian prime minister to China is of crucial significance. We have a history of appeasing China and those Indian leaders who visit Beijing usually return as ardent fans of China. It’s time India stood its ground and refused to get bullied by China.
The writer is a senior fellow, IDSA
