Chinese in general and Communist authorities in particular usually suffer from a lack of understanding and appreciation of distinctive Tibetan civilization. This is not surprising for two reasons. First, Chinese usually hold a Sinocentric view of non-Han social groups, being always proud of Chinese historical achievement. This leads to a low estimate of Tibetan cultural achievement in history and therefore questions the Tibetan people’s ability to govern by themselves. Second, Han habitual low estimation of Tibetans becomes somewhat understandable when we remember that Tibetan culture and language, social and political institutions differ so fundamentally from those of Han China. In this respect it is the duty of Chinese Tibetologists to give an historically accurate perspective on and a positive appreciation of Tibetan civilization to their public and leaders so that the latter get a reasoned view of the Tibetan people and their achievement in history. As long as the Chinese do not change their Sinocentric view of Tibetans, which amounts to milder version of “barbarians,” Beijing will continue to rationalize its domination of Tibet as “Han-man’s burden”. This leads to the Chinese belief that they can do a better job of ruling and developing Tibet than Tibetans themselves which is ridiculous.
This is not an occasion to give a lecture on the various aspects of Tibetan civilization. However, I might mention an example. Recently (August 21 – 28, 1992), I attended the sixth conference of the International Association of Tibetan Studies in Norway. Over 200 Tibetologists from all over the world presented research papers on Tibetan history and socio-political institutions, language and literature, religious and philosophy, art and architecture, medicine and astrology, culture and society etc. etc. It is important to note that most of the participants are from Europe and North America, who think that there are intrinsic values in the academic pursuit of Tibetan studies. It is therefore high time that the Chinese change their biased view of the Tibetan race. There is no doubt that Tibetans had already reached a high level of civilization, no matter how different it is from the Chinese one. Logically the same intelligence and diligence reflected in Tibetan cultural achievement may be applied to the pursuit of modernization. The transition cannot be too problematic as shown by the Japanese example.
I have digressed into the cultural dimension in order to indicate the cultural barriers in Sino-Tibetan dialogue. For beneath the Chinese authorities’ refusal to concede to the Dalai Lama’s political demands may be the Han chauvinistic belief that Han can do better than the Tibetans in Tibet. However, according to ethnicity, there is no substitute for the self, no matter, how able the ‘other’ may be.
If cultural barriers stand on the way of general Sino-Tibetan understanding, Beijing’s faulty negotiation strategy has proved to be the biggest obstacle to its dialogue with the Dalai Lama. This strategy would become apparent if we analyze the Chinese stand and statements between 1978 and 1990. Chinese leaders and diplomats abroad have always maintained the position that China is always ready to talk with the Dalai Lama, thereby implying that it is the Tibetans who are obstinate. This is not the truth as we shall demonstrate. For whenever the Tibetan delegates had gone to the negotiation table such as in 1982 and 1984, the Chinese had shown _no_ willingness to compromise on the fundamental issues affecting the future of Tibetan people. They simply dictated the basic terms and conditions which, they categorically declared, the Tibetans must accept, otherwise the negotiations is closed. This is not the generally accepted meaning of negotiations or dialogue. Successful negotiation outcome can result if both parties show sincere willingness to enforce compromised solutions to conflicting interests. Chinese dictated terms and conditions can’t be called talks, dialogue or negotiation.
Why Beijing insists on declaring that its door to negotiation is ever open and yet when the Tibetan delegates participate in such a negotiation, the Chinese side invariably dictate the basic terms and conditions — must be clearly understood. This propagandistic strategy is dictated by two ulterior motives. First, through this propaganda China hopes to diffuse the growing international pressure on Beijing to accept the Dalai Lama’s reasonable peace proposal: “Five-Point Peace Plan” (September 21, 1987) and “Strasbourg Statement” (June 15, 1988). In doing so they hope to put the ball in the Tibetan court. It is a Chinese make-belief. Second, they hope to buy time until such time as the present Dalai Lama’s passing which would, they hope, extinguish the Tibetan cause. The second motive indicates that Beijing is not keen or sincere in reaching a compromised solution to the Tibetan issue except one dictated by China, which is unacceptable to the Tibetans. This means stalemate in Sino-Tibetan negotiation but for propaganda sake China insists on calling for talks with the Dalai Lama so as to diffuse international pressure.
The assumption on which the Chinese negotiation strategy is based is the following: time is against the Tibetans and China can afford to buy more time until such time as the Dalai Lama’s passing, after which Chinese will and design will be executed in Tibet. The long-term Chinese strategy is to kill the very idea of Tibet and Tibetans once and for all. This they believe can be done gradually and systematically, provided China resists the present international pressure.
This assumption may not prove to be correct in the light of the Tibetan culture and comparative knowledge of similar cases in the former Soviet Union. The idea of reincarnation institution is very much alive in exile as indicated by the recent discovery of the Karmapa and many others in South Asia. To be sure there might be some lull after the present Dalai Lama’s death in Tibetan activity but his death won’t spell the end of Tibetans. For the fact is that the idea of Tibet and Tibetans is a very ancient one, deeply rooted in Tibetan religion, Tibetan language, Tibetan social institutions, Tibetan history and literature, and indeed such ideas may be embedded in the very landscape of the Tibetan plateau. It would be practically impossible for the Han nationalists to eradicate Tibetan culture and identity even as a long term project. In fact the more the Han nationalists Hanize Tibetans, Tibetans will more strongly assert their identity as a reaction. If the Chinese do not believe in what I am trying to explain, they should consult their cultural anthropologists on the viability of their long-term project in Tibet. It is a Stalinist fantasy which history and culture might prove to be wrong and unjustified.
Note: The above article is extracted from the original paper presented by late Prof. Dawa Norbu at the Potomac Conference held in 1992 on the theme: Sino-Tibetan Relations: Prospects for the Future. It should be noted that this academic paper was drafted at a time when relations between Tibetan government in exile and the People’s Republic of China were on the verge of breakdown and remained deadlocked in the subsequent years until renewed contacts were established in 2002.
